5 for services such as preventive care, as a result of their effort to stave off high-cost medical events down the road.
The third potential source of cost differences is variation in prices paid for the same services. HMOs may simply pay less than the indemnity plan. Price differences might result from bargaining; HMOs enjoy bargaining leverage because they can direct large groups of patients to providers. If the group elasticity of demand is greater than the individual elasticity of demand, HMOs might use their greater demand elasticity to extract lower prices. Price differences could also stem from a more efficient production process, for instance in billing and administering purchases of medical services.
Differentiating among enrollee mix, treatment intensity, and price effects requires detailed data on incidence, treatments received, and prices paid for a variety of medical conditions. There could also be interactive relationships among these variables. For example, prices paid by the two plans might be somewhat closer together for conditions where the indemnity plan has relatively higher incidence. This would produce a negative interaction term. In this analysis, we parcel out direct (noninteractive) effects.
The major empirical concern in parceling out these effects is selection into treatment. Imagine that rates of respiratory infection are common across plans, but that affected people in HMOs are less likely to see a doctor and only visit when they are very sick. Naïve analysis of medical care utilization would suggest that HMOs have healthier enrollees than indemnity plans (fewer treatments for respiratory infection) but treat them more aggressively (more intense treatment when they do visit a doctor). Neither of these inferences would be valid.
To control for differing selection into and out of treatment, we examine conditions where treatment of some form is extremely likely. We focus on eight common and easily identifiable medical conditions: heart attacks; births; cancers of the breast, colon, cervix, and prostate; and type I (juvenile-onset) and type II (adult-onset) diabetes.
3 Together, these eight conditions account for over 13 percent of total medical spending in the GIC's health plans.
Our results show that differences in costs between the indemnity plan and HMOs stem mostly from differences in incidence and price. Indeed, seven of our eight conditions have significantly higher incidence rates in the indemnity plan. For these conditions, differences in the incidence of disease account for about 47 percent of cost differences on average. An additional 45 percent of cost differences result from differences in the price of the same services. Incidence differences are largely within age and sex groups. Differences in the age and sex of those suffering the conditions accounts for no more than four or five percent of cost differences.
Our analysis is unique in being able to examine price, treatment and intensity differences. Luft (1994, 1997) , for example, report that HMOs have both fewer hospitalizations and shorter hospital stays than indemnity plans, saving about 10 percent of costs. 4 But they do not have information on prices (given competitive conditions, data on prices are in general very difficult to obtain). Eichner, McClellan, and Wise (1999) , using a sample of plans compiled from several private employers, find that demographic mix and treatment costs are largely responsible for cost differences.
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But they are unable to separate cost differences into treatment intensity and price.
5 Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000) show that price differences between managed care and indemnity insurance explain a large part of cost differences for patients with heart disease. Their sample is limited to two conditions, however, and does not consider differences in disease incidence. To our knowledge, a decomposition such as we perform
has not yet been presented.
This paper is structured as follows. The first section describes the methods that we use to parcel out cost differences across plans. The second section outlines the data, and the third section presents the cost decomposition. The last section concludes.
Methodology
Individuals who are sick may have one of a variety of conditions, which we index by j. The set of conditions that people may contract is very large; in our empirical analysis, we address eight that are well defined and relatively common. Within each condition, we index treatments t by k, where k runs from 1 to K j . We think of these treatments as treatment paths-major ways of approaching a given disease-rather than a completely specified set of procedures. For example, treatment paths for breast cancer are surgery, radioactive oncology/chemotherapy, or a combination of the two. This formulation serves both theoretical and practical purposes. Theoretically, treatment paths are the item about which patients care the most. Practically, many of the plans do not report use of more disaggregated services, since payment is often not made on that basis.
We divide patients into demographic categories indicated d i , where i runs from 1 to N. 5 In part, this stems from the fact that Eichner, McClellan, and Wise look at annual spending rather than disease-specific spending. Examining price effects requires more detail.
Finally, plans are indexed by P, where P = I for the indemnity plan and P = H for the HMOs.
We define our statistical terms as follows: Average per capita costs in plan P stemming from condition j are therefore equal to:
The difference in per capita average costs across plans for treatment of a given condition j,
, can be decomposed into incidence, within-condition mix, treatment, and price effects. Taking the indemnity plan as the base, this difference is approximately: , represents the per capita cost difference resulting from differences in the incidence of condition j between plans. The top term in the second set of brackets, å å
, is the cost difference from differences in the demographic mix of sufferers of the condition; the middle term,
, is the cost difference from treatments conditional on demographics; and the bottom term, å å On net, we expect some selection in this group, but less than in many other circumstances. The wide networks and loose restrictions of the HMOs are one reason.
The generous payment from the GIC is another. The employer, i.e., the state, covers 85 percent of the cost differential between plans. This significantly reduces the incentive for the insured to choose an HMO over the more expensive indemnity plan. Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998) discuss selection in the GIC in some detail. Reimbursement information for treatments rendered is based on actual payments rather than "list prices." Our methods cannot account for the effects of any differences in reporting practices between the HMOs and the indemnity plan. For example, bulk purchases of medical treatment from providers by HMOs could lead to peculiar disaggregations of payments at the patient level. However, we have no reason to suspect any systematic biases.
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9 Same-sex twins present a problem, as they have almost always have the same date of birth, sex, and relationship to the principal enrollee. Our methods may collapse some same-sex twins into one enrollee. Tabulations using eligibility files indicate that very few such cases exist in the data. 10 We are grateful to Don Westwater of the GIC for discussing this issue with us.
We focus on eight conditions where treatment of some form is necessary or highly likely in order to minimize selection into treatment. For both research and policy purposes, these conditions have the advantage of being very expensive. In total, they account for 15 percent of the indemnity plan's costs and 11 percent of the HMOs' costs.
The conditions are listed in Table 2 along with their respective treatment options and the universes of patients within which we study them. The universes are chosen to exclude demographic groups where incidence is extremely low or zero. For acute myocardial infarction (AMI, or heart attack in common parlance) we follow Newhouse (1998, 2000) and group patients into four major treatment categories. Coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CABG) is the most radical procedure; the patient's artery is cut and augmented with an unblocked section of artery from elsewhere in the body, usually a leg. Percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) inflates a balloon inside the patient's artery in an attempt to clear blockages; for less serious cases, it is an alternative to CABG, less invasive and sometimes cheaper.
11 Some patients receive cardiac catheterization, a diagnostic procedure in which a dye is circulated through the patients' arteries to determine the location and magnitude of blockages, but there is no further invasive procedure. Finally, some patients are treated without any of the intensive procedures (designated the "null" treatment path). To gauge the statistical significance of our results, we group the PTCA and CABG paths together as "intense" treatments, which are contrasted with the "null"
and catheterization paths.
For births, we distinguish between normal and caesarian-section deliveries (the latter being intense). We consider only pregnancies that result in live births, as these are the simplest to identify in the GIC eligibility files. Twins are treated as one birth event.
We consider cancers affecting four different parts of the body: the breast, cervix, colon and prostate. For the cancers, the three different treatment paths are surgery, radiation oncology/chemotherapy (RO/C), and a combination of the first two treatments. A rough ranking of the paths' intensity would position RO/C alone as the least intense, then surgery, then a combination of the two as the most intense. The vast majority of cancer sufferers in either plan undergo surgery, and thus follow either the first or the third treatment path. We consider either path involving surgery to be a intense treatment. We also track inpatient and outpatient visits involving diagnostic radiology and patient management.
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The last column of Table 2 describes our conventions for identifying conditionrelated claims. The issue of identifying conditions is complicated, and there is a potential for "ascertainment bias" -the method of determining people with each condition could lead to differing severity of illness and thus differences in treatment and incidence. For the reasons specified, however, we suspect this issue is small.
We follow AMI patients for 90 days starting from the first admission for a heart attack. A 90-day window is common in the literature Newhouse, 1998, 2000) and encompasses virtually all of the intensive care provided to heart attack patients. For births, we include nine months of spending prior to the birth, and spending for mother and child for seven days after the birth. The nine-month criterion includes all costs, including fertility costs, if they occurred during that window. Costs incurred earlier will not be included.
Limiting the cutoff to seven days after birth ignores potential complications after that period resulting from poor prenatal care (e.g., care for infants with respiratorydistress syndrome), but it avoids picking up conditions that occur for reasons other than the birth. To test the sensitivity of this assumption, we formed an alternate estimate of costs including all spending through 180 days after birth. The Results Appendix presents the results of that specification. They are very similar to those using the seven-day definition.
We identify cancer patients as those whose records contain a diagnosis of one of four major cancers matched with either surgery or radioactive oncology and/or chemotherapy (RO/C) treatment. We do not include a null path for cancer treatment, since records may contain cancer diagnoses for procedures designed only to detect (and not to treat) cancers. For example, mammograms performed to detect breast cancer are usually accompanied by a breast cancer diagnosis though the results of the tests could be negative. Past studies have shown that claims data are good for assessing intensive treatment of cancer, but not cases treated without such an intervention (Warren et al., 1999; Cooper et al., 2000; Freeman, et al., 2000) . Staging information on claims data are also poor (Cooper et al., 1999) .
Cancers elicit a mix of acute and chronic care. They may result in a high initial expenditure followed by ongoing monitoring costs, with considerable extra costs should there be a recurrence. We sum cancer patients' expenditures for six months after the initial diagnosis of a tumor. 13 Initial treatment for cancer (the acute phase) is generally defined as care within about 5 months of diagnosis and ranges of 6 to 9 months are common in the literature (Warren et al., 2002) .
To analyze diabetes, a chronic condition, we use a longer time horizon. We code individuals as diabetic if they have two or more diabetes-related diagnoses over the entire time period. The two-diagnosis requirement is designed to rule out mistaken codes, and to eliminate patients where diabetes is suspected but not confirmed. The two-diagnosis rule has been suggested by other researchers (Maskarinec, 1997; Hux et al., 2002) as balancing sensitivity, specificity, and positive predictive value. We examined the importance of this assumption by looking at the distribution of the number of diabetes codes that people have in each plan. The Results Appendix shows that this criterion is a reasonable one. We distinguish between type I and II diabetes using the specific ICD-9
code. Once we have identified a diabetic, we collect all his or her medical costs for the entire two-year period of our sample. 14 A multitude of symptoms, side effects, costs and complications can accompany diabetes, so we do not focus on any specific treatments or associated diseases.
Results
In this section, we decompose differences in costs across plans into mix effects, treatment effects, and price effects.
3.A Mix Effects
Mix effects are divided into two types, incidence and within-condition mix. Note: Each entry is the share of that plan's enrollees in that age and sex group.
3.A.1 Incidence
These age differences translate into substantially different incidence rates, particularly for AMI and cancer. The first columns of Table 4 show unadjusted incidence rates for the different conditions. For every condition except cervical cancer, incidence rates are statistically significantly higher in the indemnity plan than in the HMOs. The ratio of incidence rates in the indemnity plan compared to the HMOs is generally two or three to one. Table 2 .
Differences in incidence rates may result from demographic differences across plans as well as differences within demographic groups-healthy 50-year-olds may be more likely to enroll in an HMO than sick 50-year-olds, for example. The second columns of Table 4 examine this by adjusting incidence rates for differences in demographics across plans (five-year age and sex groups). The demographic adjustments matter, but even within demographic groups, mix differences are important. The intragroup incidence rate for all of the conditions except cervical cancer is about 50 percent higher in the indemnity plan than in the HMOs.
The differences in incidence rates between the plans result in large gaps in per capita costs. The first two columns of Table 5 We show the importance of mix effects for spending on these conditions in Table   6 . The first column of the table shows the difference in per capita costs for each of the eight conditions we analyze, and an average across the eight. 15 The average difference is $107. The second column reports the difference resulting from the higher incidence of conditions in the indemnity plan, holding the demographic distribution of the people having the condition the same in both plans. The incidence mix explains about 45 percent of the difference in average costs.
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3A.2 Within-Condition Mix
The importance of within-condition demographic differences for the costs of those conditions is shown in the third column of Table 6 . To calculate this share, we hold the overall incidence of the condition, the shares of patients following different treatment paths, and the average costs of each treatment path constant in both plans, but allow the demographic mix of sufferers within each condition to vary. Averaged across the eight conditions, demographic differences in the within-condition mix of sufferers explains only about four percent of overall cost differences
3.B Treatment-Intensity Effects
To see how treatment differences affect cost across plans, we compare the share of each plan's patients receiving more intensive (or costly) treatments for the same diagnoses. Tables 7 through 10 To determine whether differences between treatment intensities and payments in the two plans are statistically significant, we use a bootstrap technique. We concentrate on differences in the chances of receiving a resource-intense procedure.
Our bootstrap methodology is as follows: For each age group and sex combination covered for a specific condition, we produce a simulated sample. The sample replicates the age and sex distribution among sufferers from the specified condition in the indemnity plan. Each member of the simulated sample is assigned either an intense or less intense treatment path using the observed probabilities for the corresponding age group and sex combination in the indemnity plan. We then compute the overall chance of the intense treatment path in the simulated indemnity plan. We generate 20,000 such simulated samples and compare 10,000 pairs to see whether the differences in frequencies of intense treatments are as large as the observed differences in the indemnity and HMO plans. If the differences are smaller in 95 percent of cases, we consider the observed indemnity-HMO difference to be different from zero with 95 percent confidence.
For payments, we again produce simulated samples with the same numbers of members as in the indemnity plan. Each member is given a payment amount drawn, with replacement, from the payments of the actual indemnity patients in the corresponding age group and sex combination. We compute overall payments, weighted by demographics, for the simulated plans. Then, as before, we compare 10,000 pairs of samples to see whether the observed indemnity-HMO difference exceeds the simulated differences in payments. Note: The percentages in the last four columns refer only to relative importances of the first-order effects from the decompositions. Appendix Table I lists the actual first-order effects. "Per capita" refers only to the universe of enrollees in which the condition is examined; see Table 2 for details. Costs are totals for FY94 and FY95.
AMI. Table 7 summarizes differences between plans in the incidence, treatment, and cost of AMI, with all figures standardized to a common age and sex distribution 17 .
The second row of the table shows that indemnity sufferers cost approximately 50 percent more to treat than HMO sufferers. This is true despite the fact that HMO patients are just about as likely to undergo CABGs as indemnity patients (13 or 14 percent in each plan), but substantially more likely to receive PTCAs (19 percent compared to 13 percent). HMO patients are significantly more likely to receive an intense treatment.
That HMO patients disproportionately receive more intense treatments is contrary both to conventional wisdom and to the treatment-intensity hypothesis. Note: All figures above the dotted line are demographically adjusted for the age and sex composition of the total insurance pool using ordinary least squares regression. Statistical significance for figures below the dotted line is computed with a bootstrap method, using the indemnity plan as a base. This analysis includes only individuals between the ages of 30 and 64. Payments refer to all services and prescription drugs within 90 days from the date of diagnosis of the AMI. CABG is coronary artery bypass graft surgery. PTCA is percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty. Catheterization refers to instances in which the patient underwent a cardiac catheterization but not CABG or PTCA. The null path indicates none of the three major surgical treatments were undertaken. Nine cases in which patients underwent both PTCA and CABG were classified as CABG.
The fact that treatment intensity is greater in the HMOs suggests that this factor does not contribute to higher costs for the indemnity plan. The fourth column of Table 6 confirms that this is the case; treatment effects explain only one percent of differences in AMI costs.
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One potential explanation for greater treatment intensity in HMO heart attack cases is that they are more severe than those in the indemnity plan. This seems unlikely,
however; approximately the same percentages of patients follow the null (or nonsurgical) path in the two insurance plans. A second potential explanation is that HMO patients get treated in more intensive hospitals, perhaps because they are more likely to live in urban areas or because the HMOs direct their patients to particularly high-tech institutions (for discussion in other settings, see Feldman and Scharfstein, 1998; Chernew, Scanlon and Hayward,1998; and Escarce, 1997) . To test this, we estimated treatment-intensity models controlling for the MSA of the patient (or alternatively the zip code) and the hospital of admission. 19 The results, shown in Results Appendix tables D through H, are very similar to those reported here. Neither patient location nor admitting hospital explains the greater treatment intensity in the HMOs. The hypothesis most consistent with the evidence is that HMOs simply provide greater treatment intensity for AMI.
Live Birth. * Denotes that means are significantly different at the five percent level. Note: All figures above the dotted line are demographically adjusted for the age and sex composition of the total insurance pool using ordinary least squares regression. Statistical significance for figures below the dotted line is computed with a bootstrap method, using the indemnity plan as a base. This analysis includes only women between the ages of 15 and 44 classified as heads-of-household or heads' spouses. Payments refer to all services and prescription drugs from nine months before a normal birth through seven days after the birth. All pregnancies resulting in births between 4/1/94 and 6/31/95 are included.
Cancer. Table 9 shows details on the treatment of cancer in the two plans. There are no significant differences in intense treatment paths -those involving surgerybetween indemnity and HMO patients. In each case, a preponderance of people receive surgery alone, with the next largest share receiving surgery combined with radioactive oncology or chemotherapy. HMO patients suffering from colon cancer are somewhat more likely to receive the most intense treatment, but the share of cost differences resulting from differences in treatment intensity is small. As Table 6 shows, differences in treatment intensity account for no more than a few percent of differences in per capita costs (except in the case of cervical cancer, where the cost difference itself is extremely small). These results again contradict the treatment-intensity hypothesis.
We also examined the likelihoods of several more minor treatments for cancer. In general, indemnity patients appear more likely to have physician visits for patient management; in addition, colon cancer patients are more likely to undergo diagnostic radiology in the indemnity plan. However, the vast majority of patients in both plans Note: All figures above the dotted line are demographically adjusted for the age and sex composition of the total insurance pool using ordinary least squares regression. Statistical significance for figures below the dotted line is computed with a bootstrap method, using the indemnity plan as a base. This analysis includes only individuals between the ages of 30 and 64-women only for breast and cervical cancer, men only for prostate cancer, and both men and women for colon cancer. Payments include all services and prescription drugs within six-months from the first date of a service with a relevant cancer diagnosis and a surgery, radioactive oncology, or chemotherapy treatment. RO/C is radioactive oncology or chemotherapy. The treatment paths are mutually exclusive.
receive these treatments. Because of the potentially informal nature of patient management, which could be as simple as a conversation with a primary care physician, reporting on this 'treatment' may be inconsistent across the two plans. On the other hand, these results could indicate a higher quality of 'customer care' in the indemnity plan, which may explain the anecdotally popular belief that indemnity plans provide better care than do HMOs.
Diabetes. Since diabetes treatment consists of many procedures stretched over time rather than a few highly expensive ones, we do not track the incidence of specific procedures across plans. As a result, we cannot present any results relating to treatment intensity for diabetes.
Summary. To summarize the treatment differences, we form a weighted average where an upper bar signifies an average of treatment rates or costs for sufferers of condition j in the specified plan. Table 10 shows the results. 21 The first column uses indemnity plan reimbursements as the weights; the second column uses HMO reimbursements. Whichever plan is used as the norm, the results are similar. Most of the values are less than 1, implying that the indemnity plan is less intense than the HMOs, although the results are generally not statistically significantly different from 1. The only statistically significant value (at the 10 percent level) is for colon cancer standardized to HMO costs, where the HMOs actually deliver more intense treatment. # Denotes that ratio is significantly different from 1 at the ten percent level. * Denotes that ratio is significantly different from 1 at the five percent level. a Denotes that this figure is approximate because no patients in the indemnity plan followed the RO/C path. Costs for RO/C were approximated by multiplying the average costs for surgery by the ratio in the HMOs of RO/C costs to surgery costs. Note: The method for computing the indices is described in section IV. The index numbers for cancers of the cervix and colon should be viewed as approximate, since the underlying figures were computed from too few observations to test confidence of differences across plans.
A summary of treatment effects is shown in Table 6 . Driven largely by our finding of significantly more caesarian sections as a fraction of births in the indemnity plan (and cervical cancers, where the overall difference in treatment costs between plans is very small), we estimate that treatment differences explain five percent of per case cost 21 Confidence intervals for the ratios are calculated using a bootstrap method. We randomly assign patients to the indemnity plan or HMOs, then create a distribution of simulated treatment ratios with which to measure the likelihood that the actual ratios differ from 1.
differences. Treatment intensity explains a modest share of the cost differences we observe between plans.
3.C Price Effects
The ideal data to measure price effects would include unit prices paid by each insurer for each type of care. Such data are not available, however. Indeed, they are not even available conceptually, since the basis of payment differs across plans (e.g., DRG
versus per-diem payments for hospitalizations). Instead, we measure prices differences as differences in reimbursement dollars per sufferer that persist after controlling for demographics and treatments.
There are three potential problems with this assumption. First, we cannot disentangle true price differences from the effects of within-demographic-group selection. For example, if indemnity patients with one of these conditions are more severely ill than HMO patients with the same condition, they may use more services and thus cost more, even at equal prices. 22 This situation introduces a bias toward overstating the importance of price differences if indemnity patients are more severely ill. However, the modest differences in treatment intensity suggest that this is not a significant factor.
Second, any changes in services provided other than the major treatment paths we have identified will be included as price changes. For example, if HMO patients receive fewer tests than do indemnity plan patients, this will be incorrectly classified as a price change rather than a treatment change. In the case of heart attacks, Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000) showed that such service differences were not a major part of cross-plan differences. We do not have sufficiently detailed data to test this with our current sample, but we suspect it is not important.
Third, we do not adjust for quality-of-care differences across plans. A true price index would take this into account (Cutler, McClellan, Newhouse, and Remler, 1998) .
One measure of quality is the hospital that a patient is sent to. We have attempted to control for this by including hospital dummy variables where feasible (for AMI and births). The Results Appendix shows that the price differences are not reduced by these controls. Thus, this part of quality variation is unlikely to be important.
There could be within-hospital differences in quality as well. Surgeon expertise and case volume have been shown to be related to outcomes for both cardiovascular surgery (Tu et al., 2001 ) and cancer (Hodgson, Fuchs, and Ayanian, 2001) , for example.
It is possible that the doctors treating indemnity patients are better than those treating HMO patients. We have no way to know this. Given our findings on treatment intensity and hospital dummy variables, however, we suspect this issue is not significant.
AMI. Indemnity patients suffering from heart attacks incurred significantly more reimbursements than HMO patients, both as a whole and along intense treatment paths.
As Table 7 shows, reimbursement per patient in the indemnity plan averages $29,488, compared to $19,821 for HMO patients. For intense treatments, the difference is wider and still significant: $50,569 versus $33,562. These differences are meaningful; 37 percent of the differences in costs across plans for AMI are accounted for by differences in prices (Table 6 ). This evidence strongly favors the price hypothesis.
Live Birth. Average reimbursement for the nine months preceding and week following a birth do not differ significantly between the indemnity plan and the HMOs (Table 8) . However, there is a large and statistically significant difference in reimbursement between plans for births involving a caesarian section-a live birth in the indemnity plan generates an average of $14,964 in payments per episode, versus only $10,103 in the HMOs. Since this difference emerges between groups receiving the same distribution of treatments, it supports the price hypothesis. Again, close to 40 percent of total cost difference between the indemnity plan and HMOs is accounted for by differing prices.
Cancer. Average payments generated by cancer patients in the indemnity plan are significantly higher than in the HMOs for all four cancers, both overall and along intense treatment paths (Table 9 ). For example, breast cancer patients in the indemnity plan average $26,562 in payments over each six-month episode, while sufferers in the HMOs average only $10,935. Payment differences are statistically significant for intense treatments of all cancers. As Table 6 demonstrates, price differences account for approximately half of the cost differences across plans for cancers, strongly supporting the price hypothesis.
Diabetes. Total payments generated by both types of diabetics in the indemnity plan statistically significantly exceed those of their HMO-based counterparts (Table 11) .
Over two years, type I diabetics in the indemnity plan required $11,023 in reimbursement while those in the HMOs required only $7,748. For type II diabetics, this disparity is $6,898 versus $4,479. As Table 6 shows, price differences account for about one-third of total costs differences in treating diabetics. Summary. To estimate the overall contribution of price differentials to cost differences across plans, the last column of Table 10 shows the ratio of reimbursement in the indemnity plan to reimbursement in the HMOs for each condition, adjusting for differing treatment shares in the two types of plans. The ratios are usually substantially above 1, ranging from 23 percent to 355 percent higher in the indemnity plan compared to the HMOs. The spending ratios' differences from 1 are statistically significant for five of the six conditions.
The magnitude of the difference is highlighted in the first row of Table 6 . For the eight conditions for which decompositions are available, we estimate that price differences account for 45 percent of differences in plan costs.
We have not explained these differences in prices. As noted above, the differences are not attributable to different hospitals of admission (for births and heart attacks). It is likely that price discounts received by HMOs reflect greater bargaining power on their part. But we have no direct evidence of this.
3.D Covariance Terms
In our decomposition of cost differences, we did not discuss covariance terms.
These terms represent the shares of cost differences arising from interactions between incidence, within-condition mix, treatment, and price effects. Appendix Table I summarizes the higher-order terms from our decomposition of cost differences for AMI.
For that condition, most effects are small; 23 the same is true for most other conditions as well. We do not attach any special interpretation to these results, which are presented only for completeness.
Conclusions and Implications
We analyzed three sources of significant cost difference between the indemnity plan and the HMOs in the GIC pool: mix (either from demographic differences among sufferers or different incidence rates within demographic groups), treatment intensity, and prices for treatments. Table 6 summarizes our results. Incidence rates are important.
Indeed, for six of the eight conditions we study, the incidence was twice as high in the indemnity plan as in the HMOs. Across the conditions, 47 percent of differences in plan costs are attributable to differences in the likelihoods that patients in the two types of plans suffer from these conditions. On average, approximately three percent of the difference between plans in total costs for all conditions results from differing incidence rates. Conditional on having a condition, mix effects are much less important. 23 The most significant interaction is between incidence and price. It suggests that the groups where incidence is higher in the HMOs are those for whom more expensive treatments are more common in the indemnity plan (and vice-versa). For example, incidence rates of acute myocardial infarction are much more similar across age groups in the HMOs than in the indemnity plan, but younger patients are much more likely to receive the most expensive procedures (bypass surgeries) in the indemnity plan than in the HMOs. Simulating costs in the indemnity plan using HMO incidence rates and prices therefore gives more weight to the most expensive treatments, increasing the cost difference.
Price differences are the other major component, explaining 45 percent of cost differences in total. This provides strong evidence that price differentials are a key source of cost differences, although our results must be qualified by our inability to separate pure price effects from the effects of unobserved, within-age-and-sex-cohort selection. Finally, treatment-intensity differences explain only a small part of cost differences. The indemnity plan offers more intense treatment only for live births. The
HMOs, in contrast, offer more intensive treatment for AMI and possibly for colon cancer.
The source of the price differences is not entirely clear. We test and reject the hypothesis that HMO patients are admitted to less expensive, and perhaps lower quality, hospitals. It is likely that the lower prices are a result of greater bargaining leverage that
HMOs have in comparison to indemnity plans.
How is it possible that HMOs have essentially the same treatment intensity, given that HMOs provide incentives to curb expenditure? It seems extremely unlikely that HMO patients generally have more severe cases, since both the unadjusted and age-and sex-adjusted incidences of these diseases are greater in the indemnity plan. Moreover, an alleged advantage of HMOs is that they are more vigorous in screening for diseases, which would suggest that if anything they detect less advanced cases that are presumably cheaper to treat.
We propose three possible explanations for study: (1) HMOs' genuine concern about their patients and their individual management of cases offset any adverse effects of cost-saving considerations. (2) HMOs, which tend to compete vigorously with one another, have a deep concern for their reputations, which can spread easily within the workplace.Thus, HMOs do not cut back on treatments for fear of losing valuable customers; (3) Preventive care-a supposed specialty of HMOs-works, but tilts towards eliminating the more mild cases of a disease. If so, treatment intensity for the remaining cases would be greater than in the indemnity plan and it would offset the incentives to provide less care.
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Whatever the explanation for the surprisingly small contribution of treatment intensity to cost differences, our overall results are good news for policy-makers who want to save money through managed care. It costs substantially less, without reducing the use of expensive treatments. Our results should be complemented with studies of a broad range of medical conditions and other settings. But assuming no unpleasant surprises, we have the positive finding that cost savings by HMOs are not achieved through curtailing essential medical treatments.
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Treatment intensity, as measured by the cost of the treatments provided, is but one factor that helps to determine medical outcomes. Physician skill levels or patient compliance rates could differ between the two types of plans. Outcome differences between plans should also be examined. Past evidence, however, does not suggest clear conclusions about outcome differences between patients in HMOs and patients in indemnity plans (Miller and Luft, 1997) . This result has been found particularly for heart attack care (Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse, 2000) and colorectal cancer (Hodgson, Fuchs, and Ayanian, 2001) , two of our eight conditions.
If treatments are no different on average between the two types of plans, why are older and sicker individuals more likely to stay in the indemnity plan? Our strong 24 Of course, the reverse effect could be true as well -preventive care could lower the severity of events when they occur. 25 In addition, out-of-pocket expenses are lower for high-cost patients in the HMOs; it certainly appears that HMO patients get more bang-or at least more treatment-for their medical care buck. suspicion is that, not unlike many health policy analysts and economists, the employees enrolled in the GIC's health plans simply have the wrong view about treatment intensity, believing that the indemnity plan offers more intense treatments. It may also be the case, though, that unmeasured aspects of the treatment environment favor the indemnity plan.
For example, customer satisfaction and relationships with providers may receive greater emphasis in the indemnity plan. A strong relationship with caregivers could be as important an input for patient satisfaction and selection as the treatment itself.
Alternatively, factors such as unlimited choice of physicians and the absence of "gatekeeper" primary care providers may explain why high-risk patients prefer the indemnity plan.
Responding to the sense that the indemnity plan was overpaying for the same services, the GIC has taken action to cut the prices of that plan. In 1998, the GIC implemented rates in the indemnity plan closer to those paid by HMOs and Medicare.
The GIC estimated FY1999 savings of 11 percent in the indemnity plan from this move, with additional savings to come in future years. 26 The cost savings created by the new payment system suggest either that our price hypothesis is correct, or that treatment intensity is falling in the indemnity plan. We prefer the former explanation, since it is unlikely that treatments would become less intense in the indemnity plan than in the HMOs when all plans effectively face the HMOs' payment rates.
Understanding the source of cost differentials between HMO and indemnity plans should help employers decide whether and how to implement risk-adjustment in their efforts to efficiently subsidize employee health plans. Efficiency requires that prices to consumers reflect "true" differences in plans' costs. Our results from Massachusetts show that mix effects-which do not reflect true differences in costs-account for half of the excess cost of the indemnity plan. However price effects, which are a true difference, account for most of the rest. 26 We are grateful to Helena Rubinstein of the GIC for discussing this issue with us.
